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GARDNER M. BROWN, JR.* and RALPH W. JOHNSON*
Pollution Control by
Effluent Charges:
It Works in the Federal Republic
of Germany,
Why Not in the U.S.-
INTRODUCTION
This article describes the recent Federal Republic of Germany effluent
charge law and the political and legal background that permitted this law
to be enacted. The impact of that law is assessed, although the assessment
is necessarily tentative in view of the short experience with the law to
date.
The economic and legal implications of enacting an effluent charge law
in the United States also are analyzed. Included in this discussion are the
advantages and disadvantages of state vs. federal enactment, the consti-
tutional objections that might be raised to such a law, and how it might
be coordinated with existing water pollution control laws in the United
States.
THE POLITICAL BACKGROUND OF THE 1976
FEDERAL WATER ACT AND THE EFFLUENT CHARGE LAW
Water management historically has been controlled locally in the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany (FRG). Even after the 1871 unification of the
nation's water management, as well as many other areas of domestic
policy, water management remained under local control. In 1937, the
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tResearch for this article was funded by the Environmental Protection Agency, the German
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National Socialist Government tried to centralize governmental power at
the national level, including water management. This trend, however,
was reversed in 1949 with adoption of the postwar Basic Law which
encouraged decentralization again. The long tradition of local control
over water management in the FRG played a critical role in shaping the
debates on the 1976 Federal Water Act and Effluent Charge Law.'
By the start of the last decade environmental quality in the FRG was
badly in need of improvement. Rapid industrialization had placed ex-
cessive demands on the self-purifying capabilities of receiving waters.
In many regions traditional uses of water bodies, for example as a source
of drinking water, had been precluded by the deterioration of water quality.
The need for new water legislation in particular and new environmental
law in general was recognized widely.
The heightened concern for environmental quality led to the creation
of a Cabinet Committee for Environmental Problems to coordinate en-
vironmental actions of all federal ministries.2 This Committee produced
a document entitled "A Program for the Protection of the Human Envi-
ronment" (PPHE), published in 1971, which strongly advocated a market-
oriented approach to environmental control. The report also recommended
a constitutional amendment to give the federal government preemptive
power over the Ld.nder3 to enact appropriate environmental legislation.
Constitutional amendments were proposed in 1973, 1974, and 1975 but
failed to pass. Failure of these proposed amendments meant that the
federal government would have to share legal authority over this subject
with the Ldnder, as required by the 1949 Basic Law. Under the Basic
Law the federal government could only enact framework legislation,
leaving all implementation and enforcement to the Lander.4
1. Federal Water Act, Wasserhaushaltsgesetz (1976) [hereinafter cited as F'WA]; Effluent Charge
Law, Abwasserabgabengesetz (1976) [hereinafter cited as ECL].
2. See Hans-Dietrich Genscher, INTRODUCTION TO A PROGRAMME FOR THE PROTEC-
TION OF THE HUMAN ENVIRONMENT (1971) (adopted by the Government of the Federal
Republic of Germany).
3. "Under" are the states in the Federal Republic of Germany.
4. See GOVERNMENT OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, A PROGRAM FOR
THE PROTECTION OF THE HUMAN ENVIRONMENT 72, 74, 75 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
PPHE]; L. DINKLOH, VORTRAG JAHRESTAGUNG 1982, FACHGRUPPE WASSERCHEMI,
STAND DES GEWASSERSCHUTZES 1982 IN DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND AUS
DER SICHT DER GESETZGEBUNG (Conditions of Water Protection Law in Germany in 1982 in
View of the Legislation) (May 1982). Everyone interviewed agreed that water quality in the early
1970s was unacceptable. Disagreement occurs over the solution.
The PPHE recommended expansion of federal legislative competence in the environmental field
in view of the limitations placed on those powers in the Basic Law of 1949. The FRG's constitution,
the Basic Law (Grundgesetz), apportions legislative competence between the federal and Under
governments on the basis of four classifications. In the first category, the federal government has
exclusive competence regarding foreign affairs, national citizenship, commerce with foreign nations,
postal affairs, the national railroads and air transportation, currency. In the second category, the
federal government and the Under have concurrent legislative competence over civil, criminal, and
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Internal and external pressures built and forced the improvement of
water quality. Switzerland and the Netherlands, downstream from the
FRG, expressed increased concern about the deterioration of water quality
in mutually shared water bodies, such as Lake Constance and the Rhine.
International organizations, such as the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) and the European Community, called
for stronger environmental and water pollution control laws, as did the
1972 World Environmental Conference held under United Nations aus-
pices in Stockholm, Sweden. These international organizations urged
adoption of the market-oriented "polluter pays" principle as the best
means for implementing environmental and water pollution control pro-
grams .'
Political support in the FRG increased for a market approach to en-
vironmental management during the early 1970s. Initial proposals for
water pollution control legislation looked very much like the "ideal"
systems urged by economists. Charges would be levied on waste dis-
chargers in direct proportion to the damage caused by their use of public
waters. 6 Some Ldnder, however, especially Bavaria and Baden-Wuert-
temberg in the south, opposed these radical innovations and recommended
a more moderate charge system which would operate in tandem with the
traditional standards/regulatory system.7 By 1976, the idea of a combined
real estate law, health and welfare, local commerce and natural resource development, road con-
struction and maintenance, and land use regulation. In the third category, the federal government's
competence is limited to the enactment of "framework" legislation in the areas of water management,
press and film industries, land distribution, regional planning, and public services. The fourth category
consists of matters that are reserved wholly to the Ldnder.
Of significance here is the fact that in water management matters the federal government has
neither exclusive nor concurrent legislative competence: if it had exclusive competence, it would
have total control over water quality management; if it had concurrent competence, it could preempt
lUnder laws to the extent that a uniform national approach is appropriate. The Basic Law, however,
provides only for federal "framework" competence and, thus, leaves all implementation and en-
forcement to the lnder where those powers have traditionally been found.
5. UNITED NATIONS, FOOD AND AGRICULTURAL ORGANIZATION, LEGAL AND IN-
STITUTIONAL RESPONSES TO GROWING WATER DEMAND (Rome, 1977). ORGANIZA-
TION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT [hereinafter cited as OECD],
ENVIRONMENT DIRECTORATE, WATER MANAGEMENT SECTOR GROUP, WATER MAN-
AGEMENT POLICIES AND INSTRUMENTS (Final Report, Paris, 1975). OECD, ENVIRON-
MENT DIRECTORATE, THE POLLUTER PAYS PRINCIPLE: NOTE ON THE IMPLEMENTATION
OF THE POLLUTER PAYS PRINCIPLE (May, 1974). OECD, RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE
COUNCIL ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OFTHE POLLUTER PAYS PRINCIPLE, (March, 1974).
BULLINGER, G. RINCKE, OBERHAUSER, & SCHMIDT, THE POLLUTER-PAYS PRINCIPLE
AND ITS INSTRUMENTS (1972); and E. REHBINDER, THE POLITICS OF THE POLLUTER-
PAYS PRINCIPLE (1972). Both studies were published by the FRG as background papers for the
United Nations' 1972 World Environmental Conference, Stockholm, Sweden.
6. Interview with Dr. H. Massing, Deputy of President, Head of Department of Water Resources
in Dasseldorf (Mar. 16, 1983); interview with Dr. M. Uppenbrink, Director, Department of Envi-
ronmental Planning, Environmental Protochon Agency, FRG, Dr. H. P. Luhr, Ministerialrat, Dr.
Kanowski, Ministerialrat, Umweltbundesamt (the FRG's EPA), in Berlin (Mar. 17, 1983).
7. For the broad powers sought, see PPHE, supra note 4, at 72-73. Some discussion of the
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system of regulations plus charges had become dominant. This system
would levy charges high enough to create market-like incentives to abate
pollution but, at the same time, would continue an administrative man-
agement regime for pollution control.
Industry initially opposed the idea of any effluent charge system. As
political support for the system gained momentum, however, opposition
shifted to implementation issues, such as the criteria for setting charges,
the level of charges, and the dates when the system would go into effect.8
Some industries actually supported the effluent charge concept. The
two main sources of support were the newer plants with new waste-saving
production processes and the latest pollution control technology, and those
older plants with recently installed new pollution control equipment. They
believed their charges would be relatively smaller thus giving them a
competitive edge over industrial facilities with less up-to-date equipment.
A few other industries supported the idea because they believed that the
levying of charges would even out the serious inequities caused by var-
iations in the water quality regulatory systems among the Lnder.9
THE 1976 FEDERAL WATER ACT, WASSERHAUSHALTSGESETZ
The Federal Water Act (FWA) continues the operation of the permit
systems that were in effect in the Lnder under the 1957 law. ' The FWA
sets forth the conditions governing the granting of permits to use public
waters for the discharge of effluents. The FWA empowers the federal
government to establish uniform discharge standards for certain major
pollutants and to determine the level of technology that must be achieved
by municipalities and industries. In addition, the FWA grants the federal
government authority to establish a minimum national water quality goal
for receiving waters, and it did so by setting this goal at quality level II
(Guetezustand II). " Quality level II is moderately polluted water with a
problems arising from limited federal competency is found in R. JOHNSON & G. BROWN, JR.,
CLEANING UP EUROPE'S WATERS (1976) [hereinafter cited as JOHNSON & BROWN].
8. There is a feeling in the FRG that once a consensus on the need for legislation is achieved,
the various parties are more inclined to work in cooperation toward the common goal in contrast to
the United States where a more adversarial philosophy seems to operate. Interview with Drs.
Uppenbrink, Luhr, and Kanowski, supra note 6.
9. Interview with Dr. W. Kitschler, Ministerialrat, Dr. H. Roth, Ministerialrat, and Dr. J. Gilles,
Ministerialrat, Ministry of Interior, in Bonn (Mar. 15, 1983); interview with J. Salzwedel, Director,
Institut fiir das Recht der Wasserwirtschaft an der Universitit Bonn, in Bonn (Mar. 15, 1983).
10. See Malle, Sind Abgaben ein geeignetes Instrument der Umweltspolitik? (Are Charges an
Appropriate Environmental Policy Tool?), 1982 UMWELT 35 (1982).
11. GOVERNMENT OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, GEWASSERGUTE KARTE
DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND, AUSGABE 1976 (Water Quality Map of the Federal
Republic of Germany, 1976 Edition). There are four classes of water. Class I is oxygen saturated,
low in nutrients, and supports high quality fish; Class II is defined in the text; Class III is heavily
polluted; Class IV is excessively polluted. The FRG uses a method of classifying water quality
developed by Kolkwitz and Marssond and revised by Liebman. See H. Liebmann, Die Notwendigkeit
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good oxygen supply capable of supporting a large variety of algae, cray-
fish and insect larvae, and fish. 2
The FWA made an important change in existing law by banning future
issuance of any "licenses" by the Lnder.'3 Licenses, which were used
extensively by some Lander, created vested rights for 20 years or longer
and required compensation when revoked. Now all waste dischargers
must operate under permits which are issued for shorter periods of time
and are subject to change and even revocation as water quality demands
change over time.' 4 The FWA also subjects present license holders to
reasonable regulations to conform the licensed discharges with the federal
minimum standards under Art. 7a(2). More importantly, the effluent charge
law subjects license holders to the same charges as permit holders. 5
While the federal government establishes the overall national water quality
level (i.e., Level II), the hinder establish definite water quality targets
and programs for achieving those targets.
The most important provision in the FWA is article 7(a), which au-
thorizes the federal government to establish technology-based standards
(allgemein anerkannte Regeln der Technik) such as best practicable, or
commonly accepted technology. These standards form one of the basic
measurements used in the Effluent Charge Law, discussed later. The
standards vary depending on whether the waste water originates with a
municipality or industry and, if the latter, the standards vary by industry.
The federal government appointed some 50 task forces to establish these
technological standards for different industries and for cities. In addition
to the basic regulatory system provided for in the FWA the law provides
that dischargers causing harm or injury to others are liable for damages. "
Those who violate the provisions of the Act are also liable for fines of
as much as $100,000 Deutschemark (DM). 7
THE EFFLUENT CHARGE LAW, ABWASSERABGABENGESETZ
After years of extensive public discussion, the Effluent Charge Law
(ECL) passed overwhelmingly in September 1976. " It calls for the Lander
einer Revision des Saprobiensystems und deren Bedentung far die Wasserbeurteilung, GESUND-
HEITS-INGENIEUR 68 (1947) (The Necessity of a Revision of the Saprob Systems and Its Im-
portance to the Classification of Waters).
12. FWA, art. 2(1).
13. FWA, art. 8(2).
14. FWA, art. 4(1), (2); art. 18.
15. ECL, art. 4(l).
16. FWA, art. 22(1).
17. FWA, art. 41.
18. Menke-Glueckert reports that there were only seven dissenting votes in the Bundestag and
they wanted a more strict effluent charge law. See Menke-Glueckert, Stand der Vorbereitungen zum
Inkrafttreten des Abivasserabgabengesetzes, BERICHTE DER ABWASSERTECHNISCHEN VER-
EINIGUNG E.V. (Status of the Preparations for the Implementation of the Effluent Charge Law);
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to levy charges (Article I) on direct dischargers for specified effluents
into public waters. 9 Firms and households discharging into municipal
sewerage facilities are not charged directly. The effluent charge policy
reflects the polluter-pays principle, which broadly states that the parties
discharging waste should pay for the abatement costs actually or implicitly
imposed on society.
The discharge permit issued by the Linder is divided into two parts.
The first, a legal part, establishes the discharge right, and contains all
the physical, chemical and biological data and monitoring procedures
pertaining to waste water quality (pH, temperature, biochemical oxygen
demand (BOD5), other concentrations) and establishes the maximum amount
of waste water in specified time periods. The specified waste water quality
levels must be equal or higher in quality than the minimum requirements
of the federal administrative regulation. This part of the discharge permit
is subject to the water laws of the FRG and the Ldinder.2 °
The second part of the discharge permit contains all the data necessary
to calculate the waste water discharge bill. The pollutants considered for
purposes of the effluent charge are settleable solids, chemical oxygen
demand (COD), cadmium (Cd), mercury (Hg) and toxicity for fish. The
permits also specify the annual volume of water that can be discharged.
The standard may be specified in terms of concentration per cubic meter
of discharge volume or per ton of product produced.
The permit specifies a maximum concentration of each pollutant and
volume of waste water a discharger expects to produce (Hechstwert).
The average (standard) amount of the waste to be discharged and the
expected concentrations (Regelwert) are provided by each discharger and
are reflected in the permit. Under normal circumstances the figure or
reference value (Bezugswert) on which the charge is based is the volume
and concentration the entity expects to discharge. Notice that the charge
normally is based on the expected rather than the actual level of discharge.
Table 1 illustrates these ideas. The hypothetical firm discharges only
settleable solids and COD whose reference (expected average) and max-
imum values have been specified. Under normal circumstances, the waste
discharge bill is calculated easily. The data in Table 1 are converted to
damage units using the coefficients provided in an appendix to the ECL
and exhibited in Table 2 below.
21
ATV-JAHRESHAUPTVERSAMMLUNG, Tr. 32 (1980) (Reports of the Waste Water Technical
Association, Proceedings of the Annual Conference).
19. ECL, art. 3(1).
20. ECL, art. 4(4).
21. Table reproduced from B. BOWER, R. BARRE, J. KUCHNER & C. RUSSELL, INCEN-
TIVES IN WATER QUALITY MANAGEMENT: FRANCE AND THE RUHR AREA 301 (1981)
[hereinafter cited as BOWER]. Other pollutants for which minimum requirements may be established
for some industries include: biological oxygen demand (BOD), hydrocarbons, phenols, cyanide,
[Vol. 24
October 1984] POLLUTION CONTROL BY EFFLUENT CHARGES
TABLE 1
SELECTED POLLUTION PARAMETER VALUES
FOR A HYPOTHETICAL FIRM
WATER LAW WATER CHARGE
Component Component
Values Values
Total Discharge (cubic meter/yr) 12,000,000 10,755,000
Specific Amount of Waste Water
Per Ton of Product
(cubic meter/ton) 190 160
Settleable Substances (ml/1) .18 .15 (Ref. Val.)
.30 (Max. Val.)
COD (0 2-kg/ton of product) 140 112 (Ref. Val.)
COD (02 mg/liter) 740 700 (Max. Val.)
The total damage units of pollution, based on the data in Table 1, and
the conversion factors in Table 2 are summarized as follows: 22
Damage Units (DU)
Settleable Solids 1,600
COD 165,600
167,200
The charge per damage unit is 12 DM in 1981 and rises to 40 DM per
damage unit in 1986.' Thus the initial bill for this hypothetical firm in
1981 is 2,006,400 DM (about $722,300-1 DM is about $.36 in round
numbers, as of May 1984).
The ECL contains an economic incentive for polluters to meet the
federal minimum standards. Dischargers in compliance with the federal
minimum standards will have the charge liability halved by the unit
charge. In the event that the Linder have imposed stricter standards than
heavy metals, halogenated hydrocarbons, sulfide, ammonia, fluoride, phosphorus, and total sus-
pended solids. See Homef & Kanowski, New Federal Waste Water Discharge Standards in Germany,
1981 EFFLUENT AND WATER TREATMENT JOURNAL 513 (Nov. 1981) [hereinafter cited as
Homef & Kanowski].
22. For settleable solids:
10,755,000 cubic meter/yr x .15 ml/liter (.1 damage unit/cubic meter= 1613 damage units.
For COD:
10,755,000 cubic meter/yr X (700 mg/I) X 2.2 damage units/100 kg = 165,627 damage units.
Help in understanding the computations was obtained during an interview with Dr. W. Dorau,
Umweltbundesamt (EPA for FRG), in Berlin (Sept. 30, 1982), and in a letter from Dr. Dorau to
the authors (Dec. 15, 1982).
23. ECL, art. 9(4).
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TABLE 2
CRITERIA TO BE USED FOR ASSESSMENT OF DAMAGE
OF DISCHARGES, NATIONAL EFFLUENT CHARGE SYSTEM
OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
Unit of Damage Units
Measurement, Per Unit of
Criteria Quantity/Yr. Measurement
Settleable Substances for Which
Organic Content _ 10% a  1 cubic meter settled 1.0
Settleable Substance for Which
Organic Content _ 10% 1 cubic meter settled 0.1
Oxidizable Substance, as
Measured by CODb 100 kg 2.2
Mercury & Compounds' 100 g Hg 5.0
Cadmium & Compoundsc 100 g Cd 1.0
Toxicity Toward Fish 1000 cubic meter wastewater 0.3 Gd
'Measurement procedure: reduce amount by 0.1 mllliter waste water beforehand.bMeasurement procedure: reduce amount by 16 mg per liter waste water beforehand. Silver sulfate
is the catalyst in the dichromate method specified.
'Measurement procedure for Hg and Cd: atomic absorption spectrometer.
dGF is the dilution factor, e.g., down or up to nontoxicity. If waste water is discharged in coastal
waters, toxicity is not considered for those substances whose content is based on salts which are
comparable to those in ocean water.
those set by the federal government, the standard of the LUnder must be
met in order to qualify for the 50 percent discount.24
The normal (expected) value will ordinarily not exceed the federal
minimum standard. In the example above, the bill would be halved to
1,003,200 DM (about $361,150) if the firm met the federal minimum.
If actual waste discharge is above the federal minimum, using the average
(monitor value) of the last five observations, the polluter faces legal
consequences under the FWA25 and loses the 50 percent reduction in the
charge obligation.26
The ECL and FWA are keyed primarily to expected performance.
Seasonal and other variations in discharge, however, are important con-
siderations. Damage generally is a function of actual, not average, dis-
charge. In recognition of this, maximum concentration values and volume
are defined and the maximum cannot be more than twice the expected
values stipulated by the discharger. The physical basis for the charge
24. ECL, art. 9(5).
25. FWA, art. 12 (withdrawal of license).
26. ECL, art. 9(5).
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therefore is at least one-half the maximum value. If the maximum value
is exceeded more than once, then the value on which the charge typically
is computed (Regelwert) is increased. Thereafter the new basis for the
charge increases by the amount the maximum actually is exceeded.27
The Hardship Clause
The ECL contains a hardship clause that permits temporary exemptions
where imposition of the effluent charge would result in significant, det-
rimental economic consequences. An exemption may be for the whole
charge or a part of it. Eleven industries, several counties, and a number
of cities have petitioned the Minister of the Interior to date for exemptions.
Although the hardship clause has yet to be used, many who were inter-
viewed thought the clause was important in gaining political acceptance
of the legislation.29
Magnitude of the Charge and the Minimum Standard
Because few revenues have been collected and too little time has elapsed
to make a representative study of actual impacts, it is not possible to
report the actual economic effect of the new water quality laws on mu-
nicipalities and industries. One study, however, appraised the likely im-
pact of an effluent charge on 26 of the major water polluting industries
in the country. The cost of the charge and avoidance measures was less
than two percent of sales for the most serious polluters except in the pulp,
yeast, and leather industrial branches.3" Sales for the last two industries
rank in the lowest twenty percent of the group surveyed.3' Only in the
pulp sector does the charge component loom large. Should the new water
quality laws put some of the pulp plants out of business, it would be
seen as a modest advancement of the anticipated date of demise of old,
27. The new standard value is the old level increased by one-half the amount by which the
maximum exceeded the old minimum. See ECL, art. 4(4). The basis for computing the charge is
reduced if the discharger anticipates that his actual volume and concentration will be below his
previously stipulated expected value (or standard value) by at least 25 percent for at least one-fourth
of a year. See ECL, art. 4(5). In this case, the charge is based either on the actual performance or
on the downward revised expected value.
28. ECL, art. 9(6).
29. Interviews with Dr. W. Kitschler, Ministerialrat, Ministry of Interior, in Bonn (Mar. 15,
1983); Dr. Martin Uppenbrink, Director, Department of Environmental Planning, Umweltbandesamt
(EPA for FRG) in Berlin (Mar. 17, 1983); Dr. Hans-Peter Luhr, Umweltbundesamt (EPA for FRG),
in Berlin (Mar. 17, 1983); Dr. Herbert Massing, supra note 6; Dr. Jurgen Salzwedel, supra note 9;
Dr. E. Rehbinder, Professor, School of Law, J. W. Goethe University in Frankfurt/Main (Mar. 14,
1983); Dr. F. Schr6der, Department of Interior in Munich, Bavaria (Mar. 18, 1983).
30. G. RINCKE, UNTERSUCHUNG UBER WIRTSCHAFrLICHE AUSWIRKUNGEN DER
VORGESEHENEN ABWASSERABGABE AUF ABWASSERINTENSIVE PRODUKTION-
SZWEIGE (Study of the Economic Effects of the Expected Effluent Charge on Effluent Intensive
Branches of Production) (Feb. 1976).
31. Id.
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technologically dated plants. Short of a full-scale study of each sector's
domestic and international competitive position, a one or two percent
increase in the cost of products is not necessarily innocuous. This increase,
however, is small compared to variations in advertising budgets and
annual changes in interest and wage rates, and probably is small compared
to annual changes in raw material costs.
The charge for waste treatment by municipalities depends on the size
of the municipality, desired level of waste treatment, and the age of
equipment.32 It is high when new facilities are built and tapers off as the
financing obligations are met because the charge varies with financial
costs rather than real costs.33 One study found that sewerage charge rates
varied from .60 DM per cubic meter to 3 DM per cubic meter, but the
charge in large municipalities did not exceed 1 DM per cubic meter.34
The effluent charge component of the new laws increased the unit cost
by .03 DM per cubic meter in 1981. The increase will amount to .11
DM per cubic meter in 1986. The effluent charge component in 1986 will
amount to about 3.26 DM or $1.30 per year per inhabitant. The cost of
adding facilities to meet the minimum standards expressed on a volume
basis was estimated to be about .33 DM per cubic meter for the munic-
ipalities surveyed or perhaps 10 DM ($4.00) per year if per capita annual
consumption is 30 cubic meters. Adding together the cost of the charge
(about $1.30) and the necessary new facilities (about $4.00) the estimated
total cost is under about $6 per year per inhabitant to meet the requirements
of the new water quality laws.
TASK FORCE GROUPS TO ESTABLISH
MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS
The Federal Ministry of Interior initially established 60 task forces,
one for each major polluting activity. The Minister of the Interior ap-
pointed the task forces and the members were drawn from the federal
and Ldnder governments and representatives from the relevant industries.
Technical expertise was brought in from universities, technical institutes,
and consulting firms. The purpose of the task force was to establish
minimum standards compatible with generally accepted standards of tech-
32. Interview with H. Massing, supra note 6.
33. See Ewringmann, Hansmeyer, Hoffmann, & Kibat, Auswirkungen des Abwasserabgaben-
gesetzes auf Industrielle Indirekeinleiter (Effects of the Effluent Charge Law on Industrial Indirect
Dischargers), 2/81 UMWELTBUNDESAMT BERICHTE 14 (Feb. 1981) [hereinafter cited as
Ewringmann].
34. Id.
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TABLE 3
FEDERAL MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR MUNICIPALITIES
Chemical Biochemical
Settleable Oxygen Oxygen Demand
Samples According to Load Solids Demand (COD) After 5 Days
Category of Discharger mIll mg/1 (BPD5) mg/l
Load Cat. 1:
Less than 60 kg per day
BOD 5 (Untreated)
Grab Sample 0.2 - -
2-Hr. Mixed Sample - 180 45
24-Hr. Mixed Sample - 120 30
Load Cat. 2:
60-600 kg per day
BOD5 (Untreated)
Grab Sample 0.3 - -
2-Hr. Mixed Sample - 160 35
24-Hr. Mixed Sample - 110 25
Load Cat. 3:
More than 600 kg per day
BOD5 (Untreated)
Grab Sample 0.3 - -
2-Hr. Mixed Sample - 140 30
24-Hr. Mixed Sample - 100 20
nology.35 Volumes and concentrations regularly issued with new effluent
discharge permits and standards, acceptable to a majority of experts in
the field, describe the minimum standard level desired. Table 3 illustrates
the standards for municipalities of three different sizes.36
The idea of a task force to establish minimum standards and the com-
35. INSTITUTE FOR WASSER-BODEN-UND LUFTHYGIENE DES BUNDESGESUN-
DHEITSAMTES, HINWEISE ZUR ERARBEITUNG DER MINDESTANFORDERUNGEN NACH
ARTIKEL 7aWHG DURCH DIE ARBEITGRUPPEN FUR EINZELNE INDUSTRIEBEREICHE
(Berlin, Sept. 9, 1977) (Suggestions for the Establishment of Minimum Standards Under the FWA,
art. 7(a) Through the Task Forces for Specific Industries).
36. The minimum standards for municipalities are found in the relevant task force report,
SCHMUTZWASSER VWV, ERSTE ALLGEMEINE VERWALTUNGSVORSCHIFTOBER MIN-
DESTANFORDERUNGEN AN DAS EINLEITEN VON SCHMUTZWASSER AUS GEMEINDEN
IN GEWASSER- I (January 24, 1979) (First Comprehensive Administrative Regulations on the Flow
of Polluted Waters of Our Municipalities in Flood Area-l). It was reported that these standards are
equivalent to 93 percent removal of BOD 5 for small communities and 94.5 percent for large cities.
Interview with F. Schafhausen, Umweltbundesamt (EPA for FRG), in Berlin (Nov. 25, 1982).
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position of that task force form the crucial ingredients of the new laws
in the FRG and in the laws' implementation. The Lnder, by voting for
the new FWA, gave up their control to set minimum water quality stan-
dards before they knew what the new minimum effluent standards were.
Basically, they were being asked to give up an unspecified amount of
power.
An effective safeguard against too much loss of control is to provide
a role for the Under and the polluters in the standard-setting process.
The task force provided the institutional vehicle for this protection. How-
ever strong the appetite for improving water quality the Ministry of In-
terior may have had, the appointment process had to recognize the bare
fact that each state had to enact implementing legislation and carry out
the attendant enforcement responsibilities. Moreover, the Bundesrat must
pass the regulations recommended by each task force. The task force
created the practical means for postponing the debate over technical min-
utia which would have mired the legislative process and extended the
date of enactment further into the future.
THE POLLUTER-PAYS PRINCIPLE AND EFFLUENT CHARGES
A first step in evaluating the actual effluent charge system is to consider
the characteristics of an ideally efficient system. From this comparison,
it will be seen that the actual effluent charge system bears little resem-
blance to an idealized one.37 This unsurprising finding means, however,
that the search for merit and deficiencies must be made in the murky
realm of second-best analysis where judgment and partial analysis play
a more prominent role than rigorous proofs in a general equilibrium
context.
37. An effluent charge is a financial obligation that must be borne by some entity
discharging waste, treated or untreated, into a natural water course. The entity can be
a firm or municipality or even an individual household. The size of the bill for the
effluent discharge varies with the amount of pollution produced, at least in principle.
the effluent charge is imposed even if the authority does not treat the particular effluent.
JOHNSON & BROWN, supra note 7, at 14.
Under an effluent charge system the person who benefits from depositing wastes into public waters
is charged in proportion to the benefits received. This tends to induce polluters to reduce the amount
of wastes discharged, and promotes economic efficiency.
For example, a polluter who is charged $25 for each ton of suspended solids dis-
charged will pay only if that is the cheapest way for the enterprise to dispose of the
waste. If $25 reflects the cost of treatment others would willingly spend to remove
each ton of suspended solids, the value of resources used by one party to remove
waste is just balanced by the value other parties gain by producing the waste. In
contrast, if the polluter does not pay an effluent charge for disposing of his waste,
there is no reason for him to economize on waste production. The polluter understand-
ably will act as though his cost of discharging waste is zero, but society will bear an
expenditure of $25 to treat or endure the waste. This is inefficient, as the additional
expenditure of resources to treat waste is not matched by a corresponding positive
value derived from discharging the waste.
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No significant differences exist between an idealized effluent charge
system and an idealized standards system. For each, public managers,
blessed with adequate information, calculate just that level of water qual-
ity in a river for which the benefits of extra quality are matched by the
cost society necessarily must bear to preserve that extra quality.38 Dis-
covering this magic point (or vector with multiple qualitative character-
istics) requires enough knowledge to permit the rule maker to calculate
what each polluter would be willing to pay to discharge an extra unit of
waste. The water quality manager can achieve the desired outcome either
by posting a common effluent charge or by issuing individual (optimum)
standards to each "consumer" of water quality. The charges or the stan-
dards change through time in keeping with changing circumstances.
Although the idealized system is of little practical interest its attributes
have considerable merit. First, under these circumstances each polluter
places the same value on an extra unit of pollution. Thus no discharger
pays any more than another for an additional unit of effluent discharge.
Veiled behind the single characterization, yet nevertheless of crucial sig-
nificance, is the second attribute. There is no cheaper way to achieve the
desired quality level because the least cost technology has been adopted
by all. Those who can treat their effluent cheaply will trade this service
for a price to others whose cost of treatment is high. Of course, the
incentive to discover low cost measures to reduce effluent discharge di-
minishes as the level of the effluent charge decreases.39
The third attribute, which is less important for the present study, is the
marginal cost to dischargers which is just matched by the benefits to those
from marginally improved water quality. If this condition is not met there
is economic waste. A charge or standard set too high results in polluters
paying more than the beneficiaries gain from the last bit of water quality
achieved. For many reasons, not the least of which is the difficulty of
measuring the benefits of water quality improvement, no one seriously
Following any absolute interpretation of the beneficiary-pays principle, polluters
should pay the full cost of the pollution as measured by opportunity cost. In this
instance, opportunity cost means either the cost of restoring the water quality to its
desired level or the value (to members of society) given up because water quality is
now less than the desired level, whichever is less. The extra costs of treatment bome
by downstream users of water (to achieve the previous level of quality) or the value
of foregone days of swimming and fishing on a particular stream (as measured prag-
matically, perhaps by the extra cost of obtaining the same quality of recreation else-
where) are illustrative opportunity costs.
JOHNSON & BROWN, supra note 7, at 10.
38. A more complete treatment of water quality management systems is available in A. KNEESE
& B. BOWER, MANAGING WATER QUALITY: ECONOMICS, TECHNOLOGY, INSTITU-
TIONS (1968); A. FREEMAN III, R. HASEMAN, & A. KNEESE, THE ECONOMICS OF EN-
VIRONMENTAL POLICY (1973).
39. Strategies for avoiding effluent charges include better waste treatment technologies, different
production techniques, different inputs and an altered output mix or level.
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has argued that the federal minimum requirements or effluent charges in
the FRG will result in this condition. When the three conditions are met,
there are no further gains from trade among polluters, among beneficiaries
or between polluters and beneficiaries of clean water.40
These three attributes fall within the realm of efficiency. In addition,
when an effluent charge is adopted it satisfies the equity criterion known
as the polluter-pays principle in the case of water quality. Those who
pollute are those who pay. Standards fall short of this equity goal because
they permit the free discharge of a given amount of pollution.
The ECL and the FWA at the federal level do not satisfy the efficiency
criteria set for the above ideals because each producer of a given product
faces the same minimum standard and each must meet the same discharge
concentration levels whether the cost of treatment is high or low. Even
by paying a charge the uniform minimum standard cannot be avoided.
The marginal cost of treatment in one branch of industry is not equal to
the marginal cost in another, except fortuitously, because the task force
groups were not charged with that responsibility. The next two sections
discuss the degree to which a policy of minimum standards leads to
resource inefficiency in the municipal and industrial sectors.
UNIFORM STANDARDS ARE COSTLY UNLESS REQUIRED
WASTE TREATMENT LEVELS ARE HIGH
Economists have long argued strenuously that uniform standards are
inefficient. A uniform standard refers to a policy in which all dischargers
of a type, such as municipalities, are required to achieve the same level
of purification or waste removal or to adopt the same technology. What-
ever its practical or equitable merits, the policy is costly and inefficient
whenever individual waste dischargers differ in ways substantially ef-
fecting the cost of waste treatment, for example, when there are economies
of size in waste treatment costs.
According to the Council of Experts for Environmental Questions, the
effluent charge policy is about one-third cheaper than a uniform standards
policy.4 A charge level of 40 DM (1974 prices) would have achieved a
73 percent removal for a cost of 1.2 billion DM per year whereas a
uniform standard achieving the same level of purification would have
cost just under 1.8 billion DM per year.42 Inflation and technical progress
40. Additionally, the marginal value of a given water quality characteristic is equated across all
beneficiaries when the quality characteristic is not a collective good.
41. RAT VON SACHVERSTANDIGEN FUR UMWELTFRAGEN (The Council of Experts for
Environmental Questions), DIE ABWASSERABGABE, WASSERGUTWIRTSCHAFTLICHE UND
GESAMTOKONOMISCHE WIRKUNGEN, SONDERGUTACHTEN 70 (1974) (The Effluent Charge:
Effects on Water Quality Management and the General Economy).
42. Interview with Professor Dr. G. Rincke, formerly of the Technische Hochschule, in Darmstadt
(Sept. 23, 1982).
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have occurred since 1974 when these data were assembled. Increasing
the DM values by 50 percent or more would produce estimates more
appropriate for the present. By 1986, the expected real value of the 40
DM charge will be around 22 DM.43 It would be over 80 DM per damage
unit if the charge was indexed for inflation.
The potential economic advantages of an effluent charge over a uniform
standard apply to the industrial sector as well. Using data from one widely
quoted study, at a uniform standard of 80 percent removal of chemical
oxygen demand, some pollution-intensive industries, such as chemicals,
have (marginal) treatment costs more than twice as high as other pollution-
intensive industries, such as food processing.'
The potential cost savings from eschewing uniform standard policies
are greatest when there is a big difference in treatment cost opportunities
among polluters. As required levels of treatment or the effluent charge
increase, opportunities for substituting low cost for high cost treatment
diminish, and the economic advantage of the effluent charge over uniform
standards is eroded.45 A charge high enough to achieve 100 percent re-
moval for all is the same as a uniform standard. At the required levels
of purification cited above, the efficiency gains of a charge over a uniform
standard are modest.46
LOW EFFLUENT CHARGE LEVELS REDUCE BUT DO NOT
ELIMINATE INCENTIVES TO ECONOMIZE
A charge of 12 DM in 1981 rising to 40 DM per damage unit in 1986
was, and is, too small to achieve the desired water quality objectives for
the country and it cannot be a very great incentive to discover low cost
abatement strategies.47 But there are important exceptions worth citing
even if the frequency is unknown.
In response to the new water quality legislation, a giant chemical firm,
BASF, has made a serious effort to manage water quality. BASF treats
43. Interview with L. Wicke, Scientific Director, Umweltbundesamt (EPA for FRG), in Berlin
(Sept. 29, 1982); and interview with Dr. Klaus Zimmermann, International Institute for Environment
and Society, in Berlin (Sept. 29, 1982). The 1986 estimate was provided in a letter from Dr.
Zimmermann to the authors (Dec. 3, 1982).
44. G. Rincke, The German Federal Law on Wastewater Charges, 95-102, PROG. WAT. TECH.,
10 (1978).
45. See comparison of charges and standards in A. KNEESE & B. BOWER, supra note 38, at
131-42.
46. See lecture by Dr. Lutz Wicke, The Experience with the German Effluent Charge System in
the Light of Irish Considerations in That Field, Dublin University (Apr. 15, 1983).
47. This view was held almost universally by those interviewed: e.g., interviews with J. Sal-
zwedel, supra note 9, H. Massing, supra note 6, M. Uppenbrink, supra note 9, M. Faber, Professor,
University of Heidelburg, L. Wicke, supra note 43. See also M. FABER & H. NIEMES, DAS
ABWASSERABGABENGESETZ: RICHTUNGSWEISEND FUR DIE UMWELTPOLITIK, 1982
UMWELT 1 (1982) (The ECL: A New Direction for Environmental Policy).
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its own waste as well as the waste of two large municipalities and three
smaller ones with populations of over 300,000, and achieves low unit
abatement costs by large-scale integrated treatment processes. BASF
achieves purification levels greater than what is required presumably
because it is cheaper than paying the effluent charge. There are numerous
other large industries with comparable performance records.
The second feature of the BASF system is of substantial economic
interest. BASF has practiced the polluter-pays principle within its plant
since 1975.48 Individual branches basically face shadow or implicit prices
for the volume and concentration of COD.49 The response to the intro-
duction of an internal liability system has been a 20 percent decrease in
discharge. Rather than mandate physical decreases the intra-firm charge
elicited a "voluntary" decrease in effluent discharge achieved through
process change, recycling of solvents, improved pretreatment facilities,
and replacement of old facilities." Even if the charge is modest, it induces
cost savings.
The charge also provides an incentive for municipalities and industries
to operate treatment plants and operate them efficiently. Inefficient treat-
ment is incompatible with minimum requirements and inefficient opera-
tion will prevent qualification for the 50 percent discount on the effluent
charge. The charge, by encouraging increased operating and maintenance
expenditures, partially offsets the efficiency distortion created by existing
subsidy programs where only capital costs are subsidized."
One consequence of the ECL (and the FWA) is the remarkable level
of investment in waste treatment plants and equipment during the an-
nouncement phase, generally, 1974-1979. One study reported the in-
dustrial responses to the new water laws52 while another investigated the
response to the new laws by municipalities. 3 Slightly more than one-
third of the towns or cities interviewed cited the effluent charge law as
the primary reason for undertaking more extensive waste treatment mea-
48. In a letter from Blair Bower to the authors (Apr. 9, 1983), Bower stated that Dow Chemical
Co. began an intra-firm effluent charge policy in the U.S. in 1958.
49. BASF calculates the effluent charge bill for each branch of the company. The bill is based
on an accounting price per unit of effluent and the amount of effluent for that branch.
50. Letter from W. Haltrich Prokurist, BASF, Ludwigshafen, to the authors (Dec. 7, 1982).
51. A. GIWER, WAS DARF AUS DER ABGABE FINANZIERT WERDEN? (What May Be
Financed with the Effluent Charges?) (1980).
52. R-U. Sprenger and M. Pupeter, Evaluierung von gesetzlichen Massnahmen mitAusivirkungen
im Unternehmensbereich (Evaluation of Legal Measures with Consequences in the Business Sector),
IFO-Institut ffir Wirtschaftsforschung (Munich, May 1980). See also Ewringmann, supra note 33,
and H. Hoffman & D. Ewringmann, Auswirkungen des Abwasserabgabengesetzes auf Investition-
splanung und Abwicklung in Unternehmen, Gemeinden und Abwasserverbiinden (1977) (Effects of
the Effluent Charge Law on Investment Planning and Arrangements in Firms, Municipalities and
Effluent Associations, Study prepared for the Umweltbundesamt (EPA for FRG)).
53. See supra, note 33.
(Vol. 24
October 1984] POLLUTION CONTROL BY EFFLUENT CHARGES
sures, while an additional 14 percent declared that the minimum require-
ments alone were responsible for increased expenditures. Another 20
percent stated that they had accelerated their construction plans due to
the effluent charge law. When the planned construction phase of their
sample municipalities is completed, 80 percent of the inhabitants will
receive full secondary treatment. 4 This is compared to a national goal
of 90 percent in 1985 established in 1971 and estimated levels of under
40 percent and 53 percent in 1963 and in 1978, respectively." As a result
of dedicated efforts to manage waste discharge more efficiently in 1981,
more than one-half the waste dischargers met the minimum requirements
and qualified for the halving of the charge in general and, in Baden-
Wuerttemburg, 90 percent qualified for the charge reduction.56
The new laws necessarily improved ambient water quality. No quan-
titative estimate of the change in water quality has been made but there
has been an improvement in the biological quality, judging from a com-
parison of water quality maps between 1975-1980. 57 Other actual or likely
consequences, some of them good and others not beneficial, are discussed
below. The subsequent evaluation is largely qualitative because the laws
are so new. There has been too little time to have practical experience
with administering or enforcing the law, or spending the revenues col-
lected.
EFFLUENT CHARGE REVENUES: A POTENTIAL SUBSTITUTE
SOURCE OF SUBSIDIES
The effluent charge amassed revenue amounting to about 350 million
DM in 1981.58 The Linder use the revenues for water quality management
administration expenses associated with the ECL,59 and for projects or
purposes which maintain or improve water quality, including industrial
production processes which are pollution-saving. 6 The fraction devoted
54. Id.
55. See PPHE, supra note 4, and P. Menke-Glueckert, supra note 18.
56. Estimates obtained during interviews with F. A. Schendel, Bayer A. G., in Leverkusen (Mar.
14, 1983); M. Schell, Ministerium Ffr Emhung, Landwirtschaft und Forsten, Schleswig-Holstein,
in Kiel (Mar. 16, 1983); and W. Baumg~rtner, Ministerium fir Emiihrung, Landwirtschaft und
Umwelt, Baden-Wfirttemberg, in Stuttgart (Mar. 18, 1983).
57. See GOVERNMENT OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, GEWASSERGU-
TEKARTE DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND, AUSGABEN 1976 UND 1980 (Water
Quality Map of the Federal Republic of Germany, 1976 and 1980 Editions).
58. Actual collections not completed as of the writing of this paper. Estimate provided by F. A.
Schendel in interview, supra note 56. Excerpts of document provided by one interviewee contained
an estimate of 650 million DM for the two years 1981 and 1982.
59. The revenues can be used only for that portion of the administrative expenditure associated
with enforcement of the Act and for the _Lender's own supplementary regulations. ECL, Art. 13.
60. The application to support investment in special production processes is described in F.
Boelam, INTERIM REPORT ON THE DRAFT OF AN EFFLUENT CHARGE LAW, 1976 WAS-
TEWATER CORRESPONDENCE 23 (June 1976).
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to administration varies among the Lander. One Ldinder used about 50
percent in the first year but this is expected to fall to 20 to 25 percent in
future years. 6" Effluent charge revenues are an obvious and important
source of subsidies for waste-treatment investments. This inevitably raises
concern that the new source of subsidy may be substituted for the old
source, general fund moneys.62 At the present time, Lander governments
offer investment subsidies in the neighborhood of 40 percent or more. 63
It takes little political acumen to imagine that the Ldnder government
will decrease subsidies for waste treatment from the general fund once
effluent charge revenues roll in. This would be a particularly attractive
substitution in times of fiscal conservancy. The polluter-pays principle
can be invoked in defense of the reallocation. It will be hard to argue
against the proposition that the dischargers who benefit from waste treat-
ment facilities (which meet the minimum standards or reduce the bill for
discharge) ought to pay for the facilities. Those who approve of shifting
fiscal responsibilities from higher to lower echelons in the political hi-
erarchy can see the merit of effluent charge as a new source of subsidies.
MORE POLICY INSTRUMENTS ARE BETITER THAN LESS
Some have argued that an effluent charge is a more flexible policy tool
because it can be changed more readily than an effluent standard.64 Others
have argued just the opposite. For example, "one serious practical lia-
bility" of the effluent charge is the inability to change it as quickly as
may be desired. 6' The truth probably rests between the two extremes.
The benefit of having both a system of standards and charges is that
the water quality regulations can each be adjusted through time to produce
a result more harmonious with the desired water quality objectives. The
objectives will change through time as a result of changing environmental
and economic conditions.66
61. Data obtained during interviews with F. Schendel, supra note 56, C. A. Conrad, Dr. Jur, in
Kiel, March 1983, and Baumg5irtner, supra note 56.
62. Interview with H. Massing, Deputy of President, Head of Department of Water Resources
in Dfisseldorf (Sept. 21, 1983).
63. JOHNSON & BROWN, supra note 7, at 126-27; BOWER, supra note 21, at 237-40, 270-
71; and interview with P. Michaelis, Justitiar, Ruhrverband, in Essen (Sept. 22, 1982); interview
with F. Schr6der, Department of Interior, in Munich, Bavaria (Sept. 28, 1982). In extraordinary
circumstances, the subsidy for waste treatment plants has been as high as 80 percent. Letter from
P. Michaelis, Justitiar, Ruhrverband, in Essen (Dec. 7, 1982).
64. Kneese and Bower, supra note 38.
65. W. BAUMOL & W. OATES, THE THEORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY THE EX-
TERNALITIES, PUBLIC OUTLAYS & THE QUALITY OF LIFE 154 (1975). To support their
view they refer the reader to the history of tax changes.
66. The added flexibility provided by multiple regulatory instruments is a further point in favor
of adopting a charge policy in the United States.
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A combined charge and standards system is advantageous in a decen-
tralized decisionmaking framework where the control from above is cir-
cumscribed. For example, Lander can regulate the aggregate discharge
level of a municipality but they are powerless to establish charges for the
firms and households in the municipalities. The Ldnder may charge the
municipalities for their waste discharge, but they cannot force munici-
palities to adopt pricing policies for water quantity or quality which make
the indirect dischargers, the customers of the municipalities, see the
marginal economic consequences of their waste discharge decisions. In-
troducing an effluent charge typically increases the costs of a continued
average or nonmarginal pricing policy for all customers. Customers who
are not the cause of the increased price, because they do not pollute or
their pollution is more benign, now have an economic incentive to pres-
sure the municipality to adopt a more rational charge policy.
Evidence of the inducement to change customer pricing policies created
by the effluent charge is provided in a survey of 52 municipalities.67
Nearly one-fourth of the municipalities had decided to change the structure
of their water and sewerage fees in response to the effluent charge prior
to the policy actually taking effect. More can be expected to change their
fee structure with time.6
8
There is a further advantage of a combined charge and standard regime
in a decentralized system. It is difficult for an authority like the state to
use an effluent charge alone to achieve a desired ambient water quality
when the state has no control over the pricing policy of municipalities
or other pubic agencies with their own pricing policies. One reasonable
strategy is for the state to set standards to achieve desired water quality
goals and then introduce a charge system which satisfies non-water quality
efficiency criteria such as equity considerations.
EFFLUENT CHARGES CHANGE THE COSTS OF ENFORCEMENT
There is no reason why enforcement costs should be different with an
ideal effluent charge compared to an ideal standard.69
In the absence of an effluent charge, the reward for violating a standard
is the expected gross profit of the actions less the expected costs associated
67. See Zur Bedeutung von Awasserabgabe und Entwiisserungsgebfihren fir die Effizienz der
rommunalen Entwdsserung 39 FINANZARCHIV 101 (1981) (Concerning the Significance of the
Effluent Charge and Sewerage Fees for the Efficiency of Municipal Sewerage); and H. NIEMES,
.UMWELT ALS SCHADSTOFFEMPFANGER (1981) (Environment as Receiver of Waste Mate-
rials).
68. Id.
69. We can only speculate on the truth of this assertion at present, since it is too soon to obtain
qualitative or quantitative evidence on the new German program.
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with being caught."° If it is reasonable to assume that in a combined
charge and standard system those caught accidentally or intentionally
exceeding the legal standard would have to pay fines plus charges which
vary with the unreported quantities discharged, then the charge system
reduces the expected net benefit of violating the standard. Thus, a given
level of compliance can be achieved at a lower enforcement cost in the
presence of a charge. Alternatively, a higher level of compliance can be
achieved (with a standard and charge) than was obtained at the old cost
of enforcement, when there only was a standard. In short, noncompliance
should decrease when it is less rewarding so enforcement can be cut back
accordingly.
Enforcement costs also will be lower if there is some trade-off between
"justice" and economic sanctions in the world of practical affairs. Pol-
luters might argue successfully that because they are paying, the frequency
of punitive proceedings or level of punishment should be mitigated. This
argument is unavailable in a pure standards system because no effluent
charges are levied.
The arguments for decreased enforcement costs focus on the (net)
benefits of evasion to the evader. The outcome, when viewed from the
supply side, is different. Prior to an effluent charge the reward to the
inder water quality management authority for enforcing water quality
standards is improved water quality. Because effluent charge revenues
cover the hUnder's costs of administering the effluent charge law, the
water quality management agencies in the hUnder will be encouraged to
increase enforcement activities. The rewards are improved water quality
and a larger agency, with the expansion automatically financed by effluent
charge revenues. The net result of these qualitative arguments is: (1) there
will be a greater resemblance of actual discharge with legally mandated
standards (in this sense, one can say that the quality of water law has
improved); (2) the reduction in the discrepancy between the actual result
and the certain legal requirement, in effect, reduces the uncertainty about
enforcement to polluters; (3) the cost of a given level of compliance has
decreased. It is not possible, however, to conclude that total enforcement
costs will increase or decrease, unless the agency aggrandizement effect
can be assumed to outweigh the diminished value of compliance averting
behavior for firms and municipalities.
The new legal and economic instruments are more precisely stated than
before. The LUnder have had to develop a more precise measurement and
70. For an interesting discussion of compliance averting behavior, see paper presented by D.
Lee, Protecting Our Environment: Some Public Choice Considerations, Conference on Market
Perspectives in Natural Resources Economics, Political Economy Research Center, Montana State
University (Bozeman, June 10-14, 1982). Also of interest is Viscusi & Zeckhauser, Optimal Stan-
dards with Incomplete Enforcement, 27 PUBLIC POLICY 437-56 (1979).
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monitoring system and to sharpen their enforcement practices. The in-
creased quality of data removes ambiguity and reduces the costs of en-
forcement.7
THE COSTS OF INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE
The idea of a nationwide effluent charge was a dramatic new idea.
Integrating it with standards and permits made it a complex undertaking.
It required education of legislators, Lnder officials, and municipal and
industrial administrators. As a result of the long gestation period, all
parties had ample opportunity to present their interests and it therefore
can be argued that the resulting policies accurately reflect the relative
weights of all interested parties to the decision.72
Changes in management and administration at the local level in re-
sponse to the new policies were costly. On the other hand, the difficulties
of implementing a charges system were greatly overestimated. One of
three Lander to strongly oppose the effluent charge law was Schleswig-
Holstein. As a predominantly rural region, their concern focused on the
cost and the ominous task of acquiring sufficient technical capability for
administering the new legislation. After a few years of experience, several
experts with substantial responsibility for administering the ECL have
found it to be a far easier task than they had imagined, to their great
surprise. Simple practical ways have been devised to implement the "eco-
nomic point of view." Illustratively, the need for increased analysis of
samples has been handled, in part, by contracting with private labs. These
former foes are now staunch supporters of the effluent charge system.73
All practical and effective water quality management programs require
the specification of variables, parameter, and threshold values. An effluent
71. Interviews with Schrfder, supra note 63, and Schell, supra note 56.
72. The idea of adequate representation by all parties in the political process contrasts with the
manner in which principal water quality legislation in the United States allegedly occurred. In a
remarkable and little known piece of public policy analysis, Marc Roberts explains persuasively
how environmentalists played a disproportionate role in the passage of the Clean Water Act of 1972.
Roberts, The Political Economy of the Clean Water Act of 1972: Why No One Listened to the
Economists, UTILIZATION OF SOCIAL SCIENCE IN POLICY MAKING IN THE UNITED
STATES (OECD 1974). The U.S. Senate version, calling for a standard of zero discharge by 1983,
passed by a vote of 80-0. Only in the final version was the standard compromised to the best available
technology standard. Roberts argues that the technical complexity of the issue gave great authority
to the subcommittees of the Public Works Committee, which handled the water quality legislation.
The ranking members of the committee and the technical staff had a special position and played a
substantial role in the final outcome. According to Roberts, a strong environmental influence on the
staff was evident: one staff member was married to an environmental lobbyist, some staff members
were persuaded that any discharge was hazardous, and the environmental lobby groups were well
organized and effective.
73. Interviews with Conrad, supra note 61; 0. Behrend, Ltd. Ministerialrat, in Kiel (Mar. 16,
1983); and T-W. Krahl, Deutscher Stdidtetag, Landesverband Schleswig-Holstein, in Kiel (Mar. 16,
1983).
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charge system has the greatest chance of meeting the criterion of political
feasibility if it is kept simple-few pollutants, strictly limited number of
threshold values, uncomplicated rate schedules, etc. The bane of naive
marginal efficiency is simplicity. Simplifying eventually involves making
charges and standards and other debatable components of policy more
uniform by aggregating and averaging. It saves transactions and political
costs, ultimately at the expense of efficiency.74
One benefit ascribed to a policy, which applies to all, viz. meeting
minimum requirements, is that it greatly reduces the incentive of any one
firm or industry to curry special favor.75 To do so singles one out for
public scrutiny much more than if there is a distribution of policies subject
to interpretation, adjustment, or reclassification, where the administrator
has broad discretion in enforcement. If bargaining for a narrow interest
is discouraged by announcements that policies will be uniform, then it
can be argued that policy decisions will be made more quickly. The
duration of the uncertainty about the date and content of new legislation
also is reduced, thus creating a further source of benefit. If these arguments
have merit then the resulting benefits must be weighed against the costs
of uniformity. Only path-breaking empirical research will tell us when
the net benefits of simplifying rules actually are positive.
IMPLEMENTATION PITFALLS
One of the largest stumbling blocks remaining in the way of practical
implementation is devising an acceptable and an effective policy for
charging indirect discharges. About 90 percent of all firms in the FRG
discharge their effluent into the sewerage systems of municipalities and
are not directly liable for the effluent charge.76 Three elements of the
indirect discharger problem warrant discussion. First, how are those dis-
chargers whose waste enters municipal systems to be charged; second,
do their costs resemble the costs of direct dischargers; and third, can
there be relief for a firm whose economic viability is threatened by charges
a municipality levies for that firm's discharge?
74. For example: Charges under the ECL are based on measurments of cadmium and mercury
discharges. Other heavy metals, such as lead, are not measured or used as the basis for charges.
Interview with Dr. H. Luhr, supra note 6, in Berlin (Mar. 17, 1983). Dr. Luhr reported that a
"somewhat proportional relationship" seems to exist between the quantities of the two measured
heavy metals and others found in industrial effluents, but it is by no means exact. A company whose
effluent contains a disproportionately high quantity of lead in relation to cadmium and mercury will
have no incentive to remove the lead because the charge is unrelated to it. This reduces the efficiency
of the charge system.
75. Interview with J. Salzwedel, Director, Institut fir das Recht der Wasserwirtschaft an der
Universitfit Bonn, in Bonn (Sept. 22, 1982).
76. Ewringmann, supra note 33.
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An important criterion for a municipal charge system is administrative
simplicity. This feature is sacrificed to the degree that a second desirable
characteristic, the polluter-pays principle, is achieved. Ideally, each firm
faces a (marginal) charge that reflects the (marginal) cost of discharge
imposed on the municipality. For example, firms with high concentrations
of cadmium, mercury, COD, settleable solids or toxicity would pay more
than those with lower concentrations in their expected waste. In this
manner, the polluter-pays principle is passed back to the entity making
the marginal pollution decision.
In practice, municipalities in the FRG have charge systems so rudi-
mentary that the cost of waste treatment is embedded in the charge for
fresh water withdrawals. Clearly their charge policy is used primarily as
a financial instrument by the municipalities and not as an allocative device.
Thus, finding a solution to the practical pricing policy problem has wide
ramifications in terms of efficiency.
When all firms are homogeneous in their residuals discharge, munic-
ipalities can continue to practice undifferentiated charge systems. When
individual discharge varies greatly in volume and concentrations, a pricing
policy which does not distinguish differences in volume, concentration,
or pollutants will greatly favor the big pollution-intensive industries and
discriminate against the mild polluters. A uniform pricing policy acts as
a wet blanket on incentives to reduce discharge, which would be under-
taken by an estimated 80 percent of the firms for a cost lower than the
municipalities to which they are hooked up.77
Fairness between the direct and indirect discharger with regard to the
federal water quality laws is a consideration which should be raised.
Inadequate data, however, preclude reaching definitive conclusions. Even
qualitative answers are not possible because of the presence of two major
counterforces.
Subsidies to municipalities and non-fee revenues such as ad valorem
taxes tend to decrease the cost of effluent treatment to indirect dischar-
gers.78 The advantage will decrease to the extent that subsidies from the
effluent charge revenues will be made available to firms. On the other
hand, indirect dischargers pay for treatment of storm water runoff which
is not of their making but can amount to as much as 50 percent of the
total cost in some communities.
77. G. Rincke, Die Abwasserabgabe in der kommunalen Gebuehrensatzung, Berichte der ab-
wassertechnischen Vereinigung E.V., Nr. 32, ATV-Jahreshauptversammlung, Mainz (1980) (The
Effluent Charge in the Municipal Fee-Regulation).
78. Less than one-half of the communities covered their costs, net of subsidies, with fees in the
1976-1978 period. See Ewringmann, supra note 33, at 14.
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INCORPORATING EFFLUENT CHARGES INTO
U.S. WATER POLLUTION CONTROL LAW79
The existing U.S. system of water pollution control is dominated by
a legalistic approach in two ways. First, it emphasizes as its goal the
total ban of discharges of wastes into public waters instead of applying
cost-benefit principles which would proscribe only those discharges of
waste which are not cost-justified for a particular body of water, consid-
ering the alternative uses for those waters and their assimilative capacity."0
Second, the U.S. system relies heavily on the threat of punishment, i.e.,
fines and/or imprisonment, rather than on economic incentives to induce
industries, municipalities, and other waste dischargers to reduce the pol-
lutants they discharge into public waters.
The first of the above two concepts, the ban-the-discharge approach,
was explicitly incorporated into the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments (FWPCA) of 1972.81 This concept was subjected to heavy
criticism by the National Water Commission, 2 the National Commission
on Water Quality, 3 and independent economists, who considered the
concept to be too costly.
It was not surprising that the 1977 Amendments to the FWPCA altered
the emphasis of the federal program in the direction of the receiving water
standards approach and away from the no-waste-discharge principle. This
change is important to our consideration of effluent charges as a supple-
ment to the existing pollution control system. While effluent charges are
consistent with a receiving water standards approach, they tend to conflict
with the ban-the-pollution approach. Effluent charges are based on the
assumption that some wastes will continue to be deposited into public
waters and this use is not, per se, legally wrong or inherently evil. An
effluent charge system is a legitimate means of allocating the use-oppor-
tunities for this resource among competitors. In addition, this system will
create a pool of revenues that can be used for the construction of treatment
facilities, research, and pollution control administration.
There are three major options for enacting an effluent charge law. The
79. F. ANDERSON, A. KNEESE, P. REED, R. STEVENSON, & S. TAYLOR, ENVIRON-
MENTAL IMPROVEMENT THROUGH ECONOMIC INCENTIVES, (1977) [hereinafter cited as
F. ANDERSON] contains an excellent analysis of the use of money charges to discourage environ-
mental harm and the practical problems posed in the United States by different implementation
strategies. We refer the reader to this work for a fuller analysis of some of the problems discussed
here.
80. "[I]t is the national goal that the discharge of pollutants into the ... waters [of the nation]
be eliminated by 1985[.]" 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) (1982).
81. Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1251-1376 (1982)).
82. NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION, FINAL REPORT, WATER POLICIES FOR THE FU-
TURE 69, 74-76 (1976).
83. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON WATER QUALITY, REPORT TO CONGRESS 5 (1976).
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advantages and disadvantages of each are noted as follows: (1) the federal
government could enact an effluent charge law for the entire nation and
could collect the charges and disburse them as it saw fit. Under this plan,
Congress might carry forward the same federal-state relationship that is
used in administering the Clean Water Act.8 4 Thus a state would be
permitted to implement the charge system under continuing federal su-
pervision, so long as the state met federal standards.85 Alternatively,if a
state decided not to implement the federal charges program, EPA would
itself carry out the implementation in that state; (2) the states could enact
effluent charge systems of their own choosing, so long as their choices
were not preempted by the Clean Water Act; (3) the federal government
could enact a law that would set minimum requirements for any state
effluent charge law. States could then enact such laws as they saw fit, so
long as those laws met federal standards. If a state chose not to have an
effluent charge law, then none would exist in that state, e.g., EPA would
not implement any federal charge system in that state.
CONGRESS' POWER UNDER THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION TO
ENACT AN EFFLUENT CHARGE LAW
Congress doubtless has the constitutional power to enact an effluent
charge law applicable throughout the United States if it chooses to do
SO.
86
Until the mid 1960s, water pollution control had always been dominated
by state regulation. By then, however, it was apparent that state regulation
was failing to achieve the kind of water pollution control desired by the
public. At first, federal intervention was gradual. In the Water Quality
Act of 1965, Congress sought simply to oversee state regulation and made
no attempt to regulate waste discharges directly. With the rediscovery of
the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, the federal government undertook,
in 1969, through the Corps of Engineers permit system to regulate directly
the discharge of wastes into public waters by industries.87 In 1972, the
federal government changed the rules of the game entirely and took over
the field of water pollution control from the states, essentially reversing
84. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (1982).
85. Id.
86. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 150-56 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as NOWAK]; and F. ANDERSON, supra note 79. See also, e.g., Wickard v.
Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
87. See Comment, Discharging New Wine into Old Wineskins: The Metamorphosis of the Rivers
and HarborsAct of 1899, 33 U. PITT. L. REV. 483 (1972); Barry, The Evolution of the Enforcement
Provisions of the Federal Water Pollution ControlAct:A Study of the Difficulty in Developing Effective
Legislation, 68 MICH. L. REV. 1103 (1970).
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the federal/state roles and thereafter allowing state regulation only under
strict federal supervision.88
The courts have supported this expansion of the federal government's
role in the environmental law field as well as in other areas of social and
economic regulation,89 and have done so via an increasingly broad inter-
pretation of Article I, Sec. 8(3) of the federal Constitution, the so-called
"commerce clause. "' This clause says that Congress shall have the power
"to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several
States. .... "
While early cases suggested that Congress' legislative power under this
clause might be limited to navigable waters because that is where com-
merce occurs, in recent years, the court has made it clear Congressional
power is much broader.9' In 1942, the Court said that Congress' power
extends to any activity that "affects" interstate commerce. In Wickard v.
Filburn2 the Court held that Congress constitutionally could enact a law
regulating the acreage of wheat a farmer could plant even though the
wheat was destined solely for use on his own farm. The cumulative effect
of private wheat growing by many farmers would affect the price of the
grain and would "affect" interstate commerce.
Subsequent cases have established the applicability of this principle to
the environmental law field. In United States v. Ashland Oil & Trans-
portation Co.93 the court held that Congress had the constitutional au-
thority to enact the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of
1972, by which the federal government took over much of the direct
regulation of water pollution. On the impact of water pollution on inter-
state commerce, the court said:
Obviously water pollution is a health threat to the water supply of
the nation. It endangers our agriculture by rendering water unfit for
irrigation. It can end the public use and enjoyment of our magnificent
rivers and lakes for fishing, for boating, and for swimming. These
health and welfare concerns are, of course, proper subjects for
Congressional attention because of their many impacts upon interstate
commerce generally. But water pollution is also a direct threat to
navigation-the first interstate commerce system in this country's
history and still a very important one.
94
88. Pub. L. 92-500, 86 Stat. 880 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (1982)).
89. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 236-38 (1978).
90. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294
(1964); Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
91. See United States v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940); Oklahoma v.
Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508 (1941); Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423 (1931).
92. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
93. 504 F.2d 1317 (6th Cir. 1974).
94. Id.
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Other potential impacts of water pollution that "affect" interstate com-
merce easily can be identified, any one of which would justify Congres-
sional legislation on this subject. It seems clear therefore that Congress
has the constitutional power under the commerce clause to enact an
effluent charge law to control water pollution, if it chooses to do so.
CONSTRAINTS ON CONGRESS' POWER TO LEGISLATE
The Bill of Rights of the United States Constitution contains two con-
cepts that might be the basis for challenges to a federal effluent charge
law: the due process and equal protection concepts.' Assuming that law
is carefully written and reasonably related to the pollution goals to be
achieved, however, challenges under either of these two concepts should
fail.
The due process clause has two separate aspects, one called "substan-
tive" due process and the other "procedural" due process. Under the
substantive due process requirement, private property cannot be taken by
the government without payment of just compensation. The courts, how-
ever, have held that waste dischargers, even those who have been de-
positing wastes into public waters for many years, have no vested property
right to continue doing so, and cannot demand compensation when their
activities are regulated or prohibited.96
Procedural due process requires that fair procedures be followed in
applying any regulatory scheme, such as notice of hearings and orders,
and the opportunity to present one's own arguments before a proper
forum. Defects in procedural due process can be corrected ordinarily by
modifying the process to one that meets judicially approved tests of
fairness.
The principal tenet of the equal protection doctrine is that persons
95. "No person shall be .. .deprived of life, liberty, orproperty, without due process of law .... "
U.S. CONST. amend. V. In Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), the Supreme Court ruled that
the fifth amendment's due process clause includes the concept of equal protection. See Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); Weinberger v. Weisenfield, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n. 2 (1975); Schlesinger
v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
96. See W. RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 357-58 (1977), and the numerous cases
upholding sec. 13 of the Rivers & Harbors Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. §407 (1982). E.g., United
States v. Standard Oil Co., 384 U.S. 224 (1966). See also the cases upholding the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972. E.g., City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304
(1981); United States v. Ashland Oil & Transportation Co., 504 F.2d 1317 (6th Cir. 1974); Leslie
Salt Co. v. Froehlke, 403 F. Supp. 1292 (N.D. Ca.), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, modified in part,
and remanded 578 F.2d 742 (9th Cir. 1978).
Today the due process and equal protection guarantees are not significant restraints
on the government's ability to act in matters of economics or social welfare.... as
long as there is any conceivable basis for finding ... a rational relationship [to any
legitimate end of government] the law will be upheld. Only when a law is a totally
arbitrary deprivation of liberty will it violate the substantive due process guarantee.
NOWAK, supra note 86, at 409-10.
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similarly situated must be treated alike under the law. Conceivably, an
industrial waste discharger might complain that his charges were higher
than another who was similarly situated. The courts, however, have almost
uniformly rejected those claims, where the classification is "rationally"
based,97 i.e., based "upon a state of facts that reasonably can be conceived
to constitute a distinction, or difference in state policy. ... 98 The Su-
preme Court recognizes a strong presumption of constitutionality under
the rational basis test.' If the differential treatment were to be based on
race, gender, or some other suspect classification then the standard of
judicial review would be "strict scrutiny," which is usually "fatal" to the
legislation. "0 But carefully drafted effluent charge legislation would clas-
sify persons and firms on the basis of the amount and quality of effluent
they discharged into public waters, not on the basis of any suspect clas-
sification, and thus should satisfy the constitutional equal protection re-
quirement.
STATE AUTHORITY TO ENACT EFFLUENT CHARGE LAWS
The states also have the legal power to enact effluent charge laws if
they choose to do so.'o As noted above, states traditionally have enacted
most of the legislation in the health and environmental fields. This power
generally is referred to as the state's "police power" and is the basis for
97. In applying the rationality requirement, the Court has ordinarily been willing to
uphold any classification based "upon a state of facts that reasonably can be conceived
to constitute a distinction, or difference in state policy.....
Allied Stores of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 530 (1959).
This remarkable deference to state objectives has operated in the sphere of economic
regulation quite apart from whether the conceivable "state of facts" (1) actually exists,
(2) would convincingly justify the classification if it did exist, or (3) has ever been
urged in the classification's defense by those who either promulgated it or have argued
in its support. Often only the Court's imagination has limited the allowable purposes
ascribed to government.
TRIBE, supra note 89, at 956 (1978).
The first standard of review is the rational relationship test which we saw developed
for use in both equal protection and substantive due process issues in the post 1937
decisions of the Court. The Court will not grant any significant review of legislative
decisions to classify persons in terms of general economic legislation.
NOWAK, supra note 86, at 524.
98. Allied Stores of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 530 (1959).
99. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
100. Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a
Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972).
I01. Such legislation would be upheld as an exercise of the state's "police powers," which
encompasses the inherent right of state and local governments to enact legislation protecting the
health, safety, morals or general welfare of the people within their jurisdiction. See Charles River
Bridge v. Warren Bridge Co., 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1847). "Police power' is the name given to
one agent of a state's sovereign power of government. The principal limitation on this power, relevant
here, arises from the due process and equal protection guarantees. See supra text accompanying
notes 95-100.
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regulations protecting health, morals, aesthetic appearance, environmen-
tal quality, recreation, fish and wildlife, and economic welfare.
The more serious challenge to state effluent charge laws arises from
two other sources: (1) the law might violate the federal Constitution's
"dormant" commerce clause requirement that guarantees free interstate
commerce and (2) the law might be preempted by existing federal statutes
in the field of pollution control. Under the first challenge the courts have
held that legislation may be suspect if it places a greater burden on out-
of-state enterprises than on those operating within the state. 102 The typical
case of an invalid state law under this concept is the law that places
special requirements on the length of trains 3 or requirements on trucks'
mud flaps"° that pass through the state on interstate travel.
A state-enacted effluent charge system should not violate the "dormant"
commerce clause because it should be drawn to apply equally to in-state
and out-of-state waste dischargers. The dormant commerce clause is "not
important to the charges approach," because "most charges plans can
function effectively without unreasonable impacts on interstate com-
merce."l10
The question of federal preemption of state water pollution control laws
is more complex. Under the supremacy clause of the federal Constitu-
tion,"° if Congress enacts a law that conflicts with a state law, or that
occupies the field so completely that no room is left for state legislation,
or where the congressional intent to preempt the field is manifest, then
the state law is preempted and cannot stand. 7 Clearly Congress could
102. Although the criteria for determining the validity of state statutes affecting inter-
state commerce have been variously stated, the general rule that emerges can be
phrased as follows: Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legit-
imate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental,
it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive
in relation to the putative local benefits. If a legitimate local purpose is found, then
the question becomes one of degree. And the extent of the burden that will be
tolerated will of course depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and on
whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities.
Occasionally the Court has candidly undertaken a balancing approach in resolving
these issues, but more frequently it has spoken in terms of "direct" and "indirect"
effects and burdens.
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (case citations within quotation omitted).
Huron Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960).
103. Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
104. Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959).
105. ANDERSON, supra note 79, at 130-31.
106. U.S. CONST. art. VI, §2.
107. The principle to be derived from [the Supreme Court's] decisions is that federal
regulation of a field of commerce should not be deemed preemptive of state regulatory
power in the absence of persuasive reasons--either that the nature of the regulated
subject matter permits no othe concusion, or that the Congress has unmistakably so
ordained.
Florida Lime & Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963). However, where Congress
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enact a comprehensive effluent charge law that would preempt state laws
in the field. Most federal legislation in the environmental field provides
that state laws on the same subject are not preempted if they are more
strict than the federal act.'0 8 If a provision of this type were included in
the federal effluent charge law, then a state could levy charges, if it chose
to do so, that would be added on to those levied under the federal law.
A related question is whether existing federal water pollution control
laws preempt the field so there is no room left for state effluent charge
laws. The Clean Water Act expressly reserves to the states the power to
enact water quality control laws with stricter standards than those pro-
mulgated under the federal act. " In theory, one can argue that after 1985,
the states could not possibly have stricter standards, because by then the
nation will have achieved the no-discharge goal. The 1977 amendments,
however, make it clear that the government intends to perpetuate a tech-
nology-based program of pollution control into the foreseeable future."'
This program allows sufficient leeway for implementation of state effluent
charge programs.
A technology-based federal program, however, might raise the question
whether state effluent charges could be levied on waste dischargers who
were already meeting the federal technology-based standards. An argu-
ment of this nature would probably fail, because add-on state effluent
charges would necessarily reflect stricter standards than those required
by the federal law. In addition they would come within the provision of
the federal act allowing stricter state laws. "' A credible counterargument,
however, can be made to the effect that the federal disclaimer allows
stricter state standards only in terms of the quantities of chemicals or
other substances discharged into public waters and not in terms of charges
assessed against polluters. In view of the uncertainty raised by this ar-
gument, Congress ought to enact an amendment to the Clean Water Act
making it clear that state effluent charge laws would not be preempted
by existing federal pollution control laws.
Under an amended Clean Water Act, the states could continue to im-
legislates "in a field which the States have traditionally occupied ... we start with the assumption
that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress." Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S.
218, 230 (1947). See also Huron Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960) and Askew
v. American Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325 (1973).
108. See, e.g., Clean WaterAct, 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (1982); see also, 33 U.S.C. § 1314(i), 1316(d),
1318(c) (1982). Resources Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 6948, 6947 (1982).
109. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1314(1), 1316(c), 1318(c) (1982).
110. The 1977 amendments contain several important changes authorizing extensions of timetables
for achieving standards and objectives. See, Pub. L. No. 96-217, 91 Stat. 1582-86 (codified as
amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (1982)). Significantly, no timetable is set for achieving the 1972 goal
of eliminating "the discharge of pollutants into the . . .waters by 1985." 33 U.S.C. § 125(a)(1)
(1900).
111. See ANDERSON, supra note 79, at 131 (same conclusion).
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plement their own standards-oriented water pollution control systems as
they do now, so long as they meet minimum federal standards. (Thirty-
six states have met these federal standards and carry out their own pro-
grams under the supervision of the Environmental Protection Agency.' 2)
Alternatively, the states could add a charge system to their bag of tools
for controlling pollution.
As noted above, congressional legislation in this area might take one
of two basic approaches. The legislation could provide the states with
authority to enact whatever charge systems they deem appropriate and
those systems would not be preempted by existing federal water pollution
control laws. Secondly, the federal act could set minimum physical stan-
dards and minimum charge standards for state effluent charge laws. Ob-
viously a major concern in making the choice between these two, or
among other variables, will be to assure that the nation does not return
to the era when industries bargained one state's pollution control laws
against another and threatened to move from states with strict laws to
those with more lenient programs.
VARIATIONS IN EFFLUENT CHARGE LEVELS
BY STATE OR REGION
If Congress enacted an effluent charge law, the question arises whether
that law should establish uniform charges for waste dischargers all across
the nation, or should it vary those charges by state or region. If the
charges are uniform everywhere, then the states or regions with cleaner
waters may complain they are being penalized because their charges are
higher than necessary to achieve the desired water quality levels.
One important argument in favor of uniform national charges is that,
if variations were permitted, some states might set charges low for their
less developed regions with less pollution, thus inviting industries to move
to those places and discharge their pollution there. This possibility could
well raise the ire of both environmentalists who want to keep the clean
areas clean and of larger cities and industrialized areas who want to keep
jobs.
Probably the most important reason' for applying a uniform charge
across the nation is the political difficulty of deciding on the level of
charges that should be applied in different regions. No acceptable formula
112. States with approved National Pollution Damage Elimination System programs are: Alabama,
California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas,
Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada,
New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina,
Tennessee, Vermont, Virgin Islands, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming.
Letter from David A. Greenburg, Attorney with Office of Water Enforcement and Permits, U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency, to Ralph W. Johnson (May 17, 1984).
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exists for regionalizing charges without creating great political contro-
versy. Nonetheless some modifications in the uniform charge theme might
prove feasible and politically desirable. 3 The modifications include spe-
cial surcharges on new plants, allowing states some variation but with a
federally established minimum charge below which the states cannot go,
recognition of assimilative capacity as a basis for modest charge adjust-
ment, and application of a varying time schedule for phasing in charges
reflecting the different amortization needs of diverse industries. These
approaches, as well as others that might be conceived, would tend to
discourage migration of industries from one state or region to another
and, at the same time, would speak to the complaints of environmentalists
who want to discourage degradation of the more pristine areas.
If states enacted their own effluent charge systems, without the con-
straint of any federal minimum, then significant variations are likely to
exist between the states, and the political problem of threatened industrial
migration can be expected.
COULD AN EFFLUENT CHARGE SYSTEM BE GRAFTED
ONTO THE PRESENT TECHNOLOGY-BASED STANDARDS SYSTEM?
No insurmountable legal problems should arise by enacting an effluent
charge system on top of the current standards system. As noted above,
the current water pollution control system in the United States, while
professing a no-discharge-by-1985 goal, is in fact a technology-based
system, applying criteria such as best available technology or best con-
ventional technology." 4 Under this system, the states have set ambient
water quality standards for receiving waters." 5 For many bodies of water,
these standards are being met, or can be met, by application of the
technology-based standards. For other waters, however, these technology-
based standards are deemed too lax to assure compliance with existing
standards. For these waters, Sec. 303(d) of the CWA requires that they
be classed as water quality "limited segments; ' "6 special procedures are
then established to encourage achievement of the desired ambient water
quality level.
Obviously an effluent charge system appropriately could be applied to
waste dischargers on the "limited segments" of water where technology-
based standards will not achieve the desired ambient water quality stan-
113. ANDERSON, supra note 79, at 166-72.
114. See 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (1982).
115. See Water Quality Standards and Implementation Plans, 33 U.S.C. § 1313 (1982), and 33
U.S.C. § 1342 (1982). All of the state programs that have been approved by the EPA under § 1342
necessarily have met the requirements for setting § 1313's water quality standards. See supra note
112 for states that have complied with federal standards.
116. See 40 C.F.R. § 130.20 (1984). See generally 33 U.S.C. 1313(d)(l)(A) (1982).
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dards. An effluent charge system would be an appropriate means to en-
courage industries and municipalities to improve their technology, or to
consider alternative disposal systems.
A different situation arguably could exist regarding those waters where
the ambient water quality standards have been achieved. On these waters
the waste dischargers might claim that charges are inappropriate because
the desired water quality has already been achieved. A somewhat similar
argument might be made by an industry on any body of water that is
using the legally required level of technology. The answer to these ar-
guments is that both the ambient water quality standards and the tech-
nology-based standards are simply waypoints; they are not final resting
places. Because of continuing population and industrial growth and the
need to dispose of an ever-increasing quantity of waste material, the U.S.
needs to continue developing better waste control technology and alter-
native methods and locations for disposing of wastes. An effluent charge
system provides a built-in incentive for encouraging these continuing
efforts.
The data presently generated by the National Pollutant Discharge Elim-
ination System (NPDES) make it quite feasible to adopt an effluent charge
system with only modest additional effort. The applicant for an NPDES
permit must provide EPA or the relevant state agency extensive and precise
data on the quantity and content of the wastes to be discharged under the
permit. These data include chemical parameters, metal content, physical
and biological parameters, and radioactive parameters, and cover a total
of some 68 different items. The permits identify the permissible discharges
of each of these substances, and require appropriate self-monitoring to
assure that the permissible limits are not exceeded or, if exceeded, are
reported. EPA and the relevant state agencies have a well established
spot-monitoring system of their own to assure the validity of the self-
monitoring system. With this body of data already available it would not
be technically difficult to graft an effluent charge system onto the present
regime. The principal decisions to be made concern the choice of the
wastes that would be the basis of the charges.
One of the surprising consequences of the enactment of the FRG charge
system was the degree to which more complete and more precise data
were developed because money changed hands on the basis of that data.
While the United States is further along now than the Germans were
when they enacted the effluent charge law-and it has considerably more
data than the Germans did then-it nonetheless seems likely that imple-
mentation of an effluent charge system here also would generate important
new information, for the same reason-money changes hands on the basis
of that information.
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SYNOPSIS
The Federal Republic of Germany's 1976 Effluent Charge Law was
produced at the crest of that nation's environmental movement and against
a background of broad support for the application of market economics
to resolve the country's water pollution problems. The ECL was designed
to operate in tandem with the existing standards/permit system established
in a 1957 law and modified by 1976 Amendments.
The federal act established a minimum national water quality goal and
authorized federally created task forces to set technology-based standards
for all industries and municipalities. The federal act also determined the
pollutants on which the charges are to be based and set the annual charges
for each pollutant. The Lander carry out all enforcement of the Act,
including timing of implementation, collection, and disbursement of charge
revenues. The technology-based standards established uniform thresholds
for individual discharge levels across the country. The Under can set
higher minimums if they are necessary for achieving particular quality
goals in given water bodies.
The effluent charge system enacted in 1976 is tied to five pollutants:
settleable solids, COD (chemical oxygen demand), mercury, cadmium,
and toxicity for fish. The charge level started at 12 DM (about $5.00)
per damage unit in 1981 and rises to 40 DM (about $16.00) per damage
unit in 1986. A damage unit is a specified amount of effluent such as
45.45 Kg of COD. The charge per damage unit is uniform across regions
and polluters.
Each discharger pays for the expected amount of pollution stipulated
in the effluent charge portion of the individual permit. The charge liability
is lower under two circumstances. If the expected discharge level meets
the federal minimum standards, the unit charge is reduced by one-half
(e.g., from 12 DM to 6 DM in the first year). Second, if the actual
discharge level is substantially below the expected level, the bill is based
on the actual level of discharge. When maximum levels of discharge
stipulated in the permits are exceeded, polluters are penalized by having
to pay more in the future.
Revenues from the charges can be used by the Lnder for the costs of
administering the ECL and for supporting pollution abatement activities.
The short experience of the FRG teaches the following lessons about
an effluent charge system: it is most likely politically viable and admin-
istratively attractive if
(1) It covers a small number of pollutants;
(2) It is combined with permit systems;
(3) The charges begin at some specified level and escalate during a
transition period;
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(4) The charge levels result from a process involving the participation
of interested parties including those benefitted and harmed by
waste discharge;
(5) Measures and levels of volumes and pollution concentrations are
simplified;
(6) Effluent charge revenues are made available for abatement related
expenditures' -- see below;
(7) Hardship clauses are provided to protect dischargers or industrial
sectors under exceptional circumstances;"
(8) Care is taken to demonstrate how the effluent charge program
actually can be implemented.
If an effluent charge system meeting the above constraints is imple-
mented, then the U.S. can expect the following:
(1) Charges to increase the incentive for firms to find treatment tech-
nologies, substitute production processes, and substitute input and output
combinations which diminish residuals discharge. The qualitative evi-
dence is that firms whose discharge licenses did not change generally
found ways to reduce their charge obligation. An intrafirm effluent charge
system resulted in a 20 percent decline in waste discharge in the seven
years since its introduction." 9
(2) Charges increase the incentives for municipalities to adopt cus-
tomer sewage pricing policies which not only are acceptable financial
instruments but also offer incentives for the indirect dischargers to econ-
omize on waste production. 0
(3) Charges encourage, if not require, municipalities to find satisfac-
tory procedures for better monitoring the intake and outflow of effluent.
This will help public authorities to reduce the average cost of their sewage
services and will aid them in executing an effluent charge policy which
better reflects the marginal cost of treating a given customer's effluent. 2 '
(4) The present system of subsidies in the U.S. for waste treatment
rewards capital intensive municipal waste treatment technologies by sub-
sidizing capital expenditures. By encouraging municipalities to use more
operation and maintenance expenses to reduce waste discharge, the ef-
fluent charge system helps to correct the resource allocation distortions
the subsidies created.
22
(5) If revenues generated from charges are made available for ex-
117. The small number of pollutants, the escalation of prices and the availability of revenues for
abatement expenditures are qualifies of the French effluent charge system. See JOHNSON & BROWN,
supra note 7 and BOWER, supra note 21.
118. See supra text accompanying notes 28-29.
119. See supra text accompanying notes 47-57.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
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penditures for water quality improvement, some portion of these funds
will be available for use by industry. The present subsidy system in the
U.S., by excluding firms directly, distorts the marginal cost of waste
treatment between private (firms) and public (municipality) dischargers.
There may be equity considerations which justify the present policy, but
such goals are achieved at the cost of a loss in efficiency. These losses
will be mitigated, in part, if firms qualify for subventions. Final discus-
sions prior to the passage of the ECL defined the uses of charge revenues
to include the industrial expenditures for effluent conserving production
processes, in addition to more straightforward pollution abatement ex-
penditures. 123
(6) If a charge system is generating billions of dollars per year in
revenues, it is likely that this source increasingly would look attractive
as a substitute to the U.S. Treasury for pollution abatement subsidies.
Since revenues have yet to be collected in the FRG, there is no evidence
to support the concern of several water quality experts interviewed that
this substitution would take place. A decreased dependence on the Treas-
ury redistributes the cost of pollution from the general taxpayer to the
consumer of pollution intensive products and to the owners of factories
specializing in the production of those products. This shift in the source
of subsidy would further emphasize the acceptance of the polluter-pays-
principle. 124
(7) If the cost of administering and enforcing the effluent charge system
is covered in part or totally by revenues created, as it is in the FRG, then
we can expect greater availability of enforcement services and more
compliance compared to the precharge period. There is too little empirical
evidence regarding enforcement levels in the U.S. to know whether and
to what extent the present situation is optimal. There is the danger of
excessive enthusiasm for enforcement when the budget for enforcement
comes from charge revenues. Representation of heterogeneous interests
on the board in charge of revenue disbursement, is one way to reduce
the chance for this resource misallocation-admixtures are effective an-
tidotes for excessive zeal. "
(8) Introducing an actual effluent charge system on top of a standards
system, in all likelihood, increases the total cost of managing water
quality. The fixed cost of educating legislators and others unfamiliar with
such a policy so they can vote intelligently should not be overlooked. In
return, water quality is improved and the flexibility, quality, and recision
123. See supra text accompanying notes 76-78.
124. See supra text accompanying notes 58-63.
125. See supra text accompanying notes 69-71.
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of the management program is improved when more policy options are
available. 6
(9) An effluent charge system combined with a permit system creates
a more flexible bag of policy tools capable of better responding to chang-
ing circumstances than either system alone.' 7
(10) In recent years residuals producers have been permitted to trade
environmental quality permits. The bubble concept introduces greater
flexibility into the system by enabling exchange, in effect, to remove
constraints on some firms' behavior. Is a charge system unnecessary if a
bubble policy is in place? Other things being equal, the introduction of
charges results in a loss to polluters because the implicit value of discharge
permits is depreciated by the introduction of an effluent charge. In con-
trast, since introducing the bubble removes some constraints, the value
of tradeable permits increases. Thus, the distributive, consequences of
these two policies is quite different. In practice, the efficiency aspects
seem to be different. To date, the number of air pollution offsets con-
summated is modest and the number of water quality trades is miniscule.
This suggests that there are practical impediments to the development of
offset markets in water. These may or may not be of a short-run nature.
On the other hand, the effluent charge impinges on all municipalities,
direct dischargers, and on some indirect dischargers. Thus the effluent
charge system generally is superior to a bubble system. The extent of the
resource savings created by an effluent charge depends largely on its
magnitude. What is clear from this discussion is that in a pollution offset
program, effluent charges are complementary, not competitive programs,
when the criterion is economic efficiency. Finally, if the experience in
the Federal Republic of Germany is a guide, the introduction of an effluent
charge will improve water quality. 28
In the United States it is clear that Congress has the constitutional
power to enact an effluent charge law for the nation as a whole. Alter-
natively Congress could enact a framework law establishing minimum
standards for state effluent charge laws, and then allow the states to enact
such laws as they saw fit. Objections might be raised to federal or state
effluent charge laws on the basis of constitutional equal protection and
due process grounds, but these objections would fail.
States have authority to enact effluent charge laws under their own
constitutions, and under the federal constitution; however, state water
pollution control laws might be preempted by the existing federal laws
in the field. The Clean Water Act (CWA) explicitly provides that state
126. See supra text accompanying notes 64-68.
127. Id.
128. Id.
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laws are not preempted by the federal Act if they are "stricter" than the
federal law, and state effluent charge laws might conceivably meet this
criterion.129 Sufficient uncertainty, however, surrounds this question that
we recommend enactment of federal legislation explicitly authorizing state
effluent charge laws.
An effluent charge law could be enacted in the U.S. to operate in
tandem with the existing CWA standards/permit system. In spite of the
much publicized no-discharge "goal" of the Clean Water Act, the system
actually is technology based. It would be quite feasible to coordinate an
effluent charge law with the existing NPDES system. The data generated
by the NPDES process provides the technical information that would be
required for establishing effluent charges. An effluent charge system should
not excuse waste dischargers merely because they are meeting the tech-
nology-based standards.
Caution should be exercised about considering variations in charge
levels if they are initiated by a state or a region. Not only is it exceedingly
difficult to determine the technically proper and politically acceptable
variance, but those variances might also encourage industries to bargain
among states for the lowest charges.
129. 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (1982).
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